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MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
statutory construction principles. In light of these considerations, the
Court's decision may impose unnecessary hardships and loss potential on
the investing public and, therefore, should be the subject of continuing






Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission'
Local No. 610 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
fers, Warehousemen, and Helpers (Teamsters) represented less than two
percent of the employees of the Pulitzer Publishing Co. (employer).Z All
other unions negotiated their collective bargaining agreements with the
employer separately from one another and from the Teamsters.A Unsuc-
cessful negotiations between the Teamsters and the employer resulted in a
strike, and a standstill of operations existed until a settlement was
negotiated.4 None of the other unions or their members participated in or
financially contributed to the picketing, nor did they participate in the
negotiations or authorize the Teamsters to bargain in their behalf. It was
undisputed that during prior negotiations with the employer, the nonstrik-
ing unions had withdrawn proposals for a fifth week of vacation for senior
employees. The employer alleged, however, that the unions had been in-
formed that if the vacation issue were successfully negotiated by any
union, all employees would receive the same benefit.5 Representatives of
1. 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. En Banc 1980).
2. Id. at 415.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 415-16. The employer distributed a letter to members of nonstrik-
ing unions who crossed the picket lines, informing them that no work was
available due to the Teamsters' action. The letter placed the blame for the work
stoppage on the Teamsters and professed the employer's good faith in offering to
arbitrate with the strikers in an endeavor to avoid the strike.
5. The dissent cited at length from the transcript of the administrative
hearing and argued that the circumstances under which the claimants were in-
formed of the employer's offer did, as the Commission found, constitute an agree-
ment as to the vacation issue. See note 54 infra.
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the nonstriking unions testified that they had not agreed to accept the
employer's offer. During strike negotiations, the Teamsters included their
demand for a fifth week of vacation. The issue remained unresolved,
however, and was discarded before a final settlement was reached.
The nonstrikers asserted claims for determination of insured worker
status for wages lost during the strike period. 6 Their employer protested
the allowance of benefits, maintaining that the claimants were dis-
qualified under Missouri law because their unemployment was caused by a
labor dispute in which they held a direct interest by virtue of the vacation
issue. 7 The parties' exhaustion of administrative remedies" available under
6. Procedures to be followed in submitting unemployment compensation
claims are outlined in RSMO § 288.070 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Claims are filed with
an Employment Security divisional deputy, who makes a "determination" of the
claimant's status as an insured worker. Id. § 288.070.2. Notice of filing is given to
the claimant's employer, who must file a protest within seven days of receipt of
notice in order to become an "interested party" to the determination. Id. §
288.070.1. On the deputy's entry of a determination, all interested parties are
notified, and unless an appeal is filed within ten calendar days, the determination
becomes final. Id. § 288.070.4. In Pulitzer, the deputy found that the claimants
were eligible to receive benefits.
7. Pulitzer was decided under RSMo § 288.040 (1978). Subsection 5 of that
section states:
(1) A claimant shall be ineligible for waiting week credit or benefits
for any week for which the deputy finds that his total or partial unem-
ployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor
dispute in the factory, establishment or other premises in which he is or
was last employed; . . . provided, further, that this subsection shall not
apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the deputy that
(a) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in
the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and
(b) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, im-
mediately preceding the commencenient of the stoppage, there were
members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs,
any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested
in the dispute.
Id. § 288.040.5.
8. The employer protested the allowance of benefits and sought adminis-
trative review. Generally, appeals from the deputy's determination are taken to
the appeals tribunal, which permits a hearing before entering a ruling. Appeals
referees are designated by the director and they may modify a disputed deter-
mination in lieu of affirmance or reversal. RSMO § 288.190.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
Hearings are conducted according to divisional regulations, which displace rules
of evidence and procedure common to judicial adversary proceedings. Id. §
288.190.2.
In Pulitzer, the appeals referee found that the claimants were disqualified by
the statute and affirmed the deputy's determination. 596 S.W.2d at 416-17. The
employer applied to the Commission for review of the appeals tribunal's decision.
1981]
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the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) 9 and
judicial review by the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri,10 was
followed by a motion to transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court.
In construing what is perhaps the most perplexing area of the Missouri
Employment Security Law," the supreme court clarified a perennial
source of confusion for judicial and administrative officers across the
Any party, including the Division of Employment Security, may seek review of the
tribunal. Such application must be filed within ten days of notification or mailing
of the tribunal's decision and may be allowed or denied in the discretion of the
Commission. If the application is denied, the findings and decision of the appeals
tribunal become final and are adopted by the Commission for purposes of judicial
review. RSMO § 288.200.1 (1978). In Pulitzer, the employer's application for
review was granted and the Commission affirmed. 596 S.W.2d at 416-17.
9. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission is created and gov-
erned by the provisions of RSMo §§ 286.010-.150 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
The Commission administers the Employment Security Law by powers conferred
in id. § 286.060.1(3) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
10. The employer petitioned for judicial review in the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis. 596 S.W.2d at 414. The application for judicial review must be
filed in the appropriate circuit court by the director or any party aggrieved by the
decision within ten days after the ruling of the Commission becomes final. RSMO
§ 288.210 (1978). The application must state specific ground on which error is
claimed and is not taken properly until all administrative remedies have been ex-
hausted. Id. See also Wheaton & Blackmar, Procedural Forms, 11 MISSOURI
PRACTICE SERIES § 288.210, Form 1 (1962 & Supp. 1978). A petition for judicial
review does not act as a supersedeas or stay on the proceedings. Venue in the cir-
cuit court is determined by the county of the claimant's residence, by the county
of the employer's business location if multiple claimants are involved, or in Cole
County if the determination involves a nonresident claimant. RSMO § 288.210
(1978). The circuit court is required to take judicial notice of the division's
regulations. Id. The judicial scope of review is statutorily limited to questions of
law. See notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text infra.
In Pulitzer, the circuit court reversed, determining that the Commission's
findings were unsupported by the evidence and not in accordance with the law.
596 S.W.2d at 417. Claimants' motion to transfer followed an unsuccessful ap-
peal to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District. Pulitzer Publishing
Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, [1979] 6 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH)
8363 (Mo. App., E.D. July 3, 1979), rev'd, 596 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. En Banc 1980).
Much of the court of appeals opinion, which would have affirmed the circuit
court, was adopted by the dissenting judges on the supreme court.
11. RSMO §§ 288.010-.400 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980). The present
Missouri Employment Security Law is based on draft bills prepared by the Social
Security Committee on Economic Security, which were enacted as Missouri law in
1937 in order to qualify the state for credits under the Federal Social Security Act.
Some jurisdictions have limited or altered the draft bill language. Michigan, for
example, has added numerous provisions defining terms contained in the dis-
qualification section. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.29 (1978).
3
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country. 1 2 Latent ambiguity in the "direct interest" disqualification provi-
sion coupled with a conspicuous lack of judicial interpretation 3 created
the issue presented to the court: the proper construction and application
of the eligibility conditions in light of the policy of the statute and within
the permissible scope of judicial review. While emphasizing the necessity
to defer to the findings of the Commission, the court established a stan-
dard for application of the benefits disqualification provision. The court
held that under the Missouri disqualification provision, the prospect of
receiving increased vacation benefits of a speculative nature did not con-
stitute a "direct interest" in the outcome of the dispute, and that the
nonstriking members of separate skilled trade and craft unions were not of
the same "grade or class of workers" as the striking Teamsters.14 A four-
member majority remanded for reinstatement the order of the Commis-
sion, which held that the nonstriking claimants were eligible for compen-
sation of wages lost during the labor dispute work stoppage.
The court explained two practical reasons for reinstating the Commis-
sion's finding that the claimants had no direct interest in the Teamsters'
strike. First, the statutory restriction on judicial review of administrative
findings of fact 5 makes facts which are supported by competent and sub-
12. See Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Dis-
qualification, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 294, 329-37 (1950); Note, Eligibility for
Unemployment Benefits of Persons Involuntarily Unemployed Because of Labor
Disputes, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 563-65 (1949).
13. A number of prior decisions have dealt with the disqualification provi-
sion. See generally Adams v. Industrial Comm'n, 490 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1973)
(lockout constituted "work stoppage" due to labor dispute); O'Dell v. Division of
Employment Security, 376 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1964) (construction of "work stop-
page" provision with dictum as to requalifying conditions); Producers Produce
Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 365 Mo. 996, 291 S.W.2d 166 (En Banc 1956) (con-
struction of "work stoppage"); Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 509 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App., Spr. 1974) (construction of "work stop-
page"); Poggemoeller v. Industrial Comm'n, 371 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. App., St. L.
1963) (primarily dealing with "direct interest" disqualification); Huck v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 361 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. App., St. L. 1962) (claimants admitted
members of striking group and thus disqualified); Kroger Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 314 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. App., St. L. 1958) (retail store was "factory,
establishment or other premises" as to employees at chain store's bakery); Meyer
v. Industrial Comm'n, 240 Mo. App. 1022, 223 S.W.2d 835 (St. L. 1949) (refusal
to cross picket lines constituted voluntary unemployment).
14. 596 S.W.2d at 421.
15. RSMO § 288.210 (1978) provides in part: "In any judicial proceeding
under this section, the findings of the commission as to the facts, if supported by
competent and substantial evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be con-
clusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law."
The elusive distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is wor-
thy of extended treatment, particularly as affecting administrative law. No court
1981]
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stantial evidence binding and conclusive on the reviewing court.16 Inter-
pretation of the direct interest provision arose in this context as an initial
consideration of the standard by which the claimants' interest should be
measured. The court declared that, as used in the disqualification provi-
sion, the term "directly interested" is "used in its causative sense of hap-
pening without anything intervening, as opposed to indirectly,"' 7 and that
the Commission was supported by the evidence in its conclusion that any
possibility of benefits accruing to the claimants was speculative and no
more than an indirect interest."' The court also discerned a potential
abuse of the disqualifying provisions should an employer's conditional
promise of benefits be held to create a direct interest in the dispute. By
creating such an interest, an employer could be motivated to exert
has been constrained to affirm factual decisions of an administrative body with
which the court disagreed, for the question whether the facts are sustained by suf-
ficient competent evidence is one of law to which the court is not bound. S.S.
Kresge Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 349 Mo. 590, 162 S.W.2d 838
(1942). In deciding that the direct interest issue was not subject to judicial review,
the Oregon Supreme Court, in Henzel v. Cameron, 228 Or. 452, 365 P.2d 498
(1961), provided a helpful discussion:
Whether a finding is a "finding of fact" or a "conclusion of law"
depends upon whether it is reached by natural reasoning or by fixed rules
of law. Where the ultimate conclusion can be arrived at only by applying
rules of law the result is a "conclusion of law."... A "finding of fact" is a
conclusion drawn by way of reasonable inference from the evidence....
There are no rules of law to be applied in determining whether or
not these claimants were directly interested in the labor dispute. Such a
determination can be arrived at only by an examination of the facts.
Therefore, when the commissioner found that the claimants were
"directly interested" in the labor dispute which caused their unemploy-
ment, he had made a "finding of fact".., and not a "conclusion of law."
Id. at 463, 365 P.2d at 503 (citations omitted).
Before Pulitzer was transferred to the supreme court, the court of appeals
described the scope of review as follows: "The Industrial Commission is to deter-
mine the facts, and to those facts it is to apply the applicable law .... As to what
the law is, and whether it has been correctly applied to the facts are issues of law
for the ultimate determination by the court." [1979] 6 UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH)
8363, at 28,783.
16. See Von Hoffman Press, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 478 S.W.2d 403
(Mo. App., St. L. 1972). Missouri courts have expanded the language of the pro-
vision limiting review to require reversal only when the decision of the Commis-
sion is against the "overwhelming" weight of the evidence. Board of Educ. v.
Shank, 542 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Mo. En Banc 1976); Govreau v. Farmington
Transfer Co., 473 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Mo. App., St. L. 1971); Mid-Continent
Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 420 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1967).
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pressure on strikers by damaging the employees who were not involved in
the strike.1 9 The holding is noteworthy not only because it clarifies the
Missouri position regarding the "direct interest" rule, but also because
Pulitzer may serve as precedent"0 in other jurisdictions that have enacted
similar legislation.2 1
19. Id. at 419. See text accompanying note 34 infra.
20. Decisions construing the Missouri unemployment statutes may be per-
suasive authority in foreign jurisdictions that have enacted similar legislation
because "unemployment legislation is an integral part of the national plan for
social security, representing a cooperative effort by the states and the national
government in working for the general welfare." Carter v. J.P. King & Sons, 381
So. 2d 71, 74 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (applying Agri-Foods, Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 511 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974)). See also Mid-Continent
Aerial Sprayers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 420 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1967) (compilation of cases therein); Pioneer Potato Co. v. Division of
Employment Security, 17 N.J. 543, 547, 111 A.2d 888, 890 (1955).
21. See note 11 supra. Nearly all jurisdictions have enacted employment
security legislation based on the 1937 Social Security draft bills, and for a number
of years the provisions remained unchanged by state lawmakers. An informative
tabulation of various provisions adopted by several states is contained in Lewis,
The Law of Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 13 LAB. L.J. 174,'
177-78 (1962). See also Shadur, supra note 12, at 295 n.5; Note, supra note 12, at
550 n.1.
For current provisions substantially similar to Missouri law, see ALASKA
STAT. § 23.20.380(9) (1972) (repealed 1980); ARK. STAT ANN. § 81-1105(f)
(1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-109(2) (Cum. Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-236(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-3315(4)
(1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.101(4) (West Supp. Pamphlet 1981); GA. CODE
ANN. § 54-610(d) (Cum. Supp. 1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 385-7(4) (1976);
IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(h) (Cum. Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 434
(Smith-Hurd Curn. Supp. 1980-1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-15-3 (Burns Cum.
Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE § 96.5(4) (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(d) (Cum.
Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6(e) (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 151A, § 25(b) (West 1971); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 87-106(d) (1964 &
Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-628(d) (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §
612.395(2) (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282:4.F (1966 & Supp. 1973); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
59-9-5(d) (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02(4) (Supp. 1979); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 2-410 (West Curn. Supp. 1980-1981); OR. REV. STAT. §
657.200(3) (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(d) (Purdon 1964); S.C. CODE §
41-35-120(4) (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 61-6-19 (1967 & Supp. 1978);
TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-3(d) (Vernon Supp. Pamphlet 1980-1981); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1344(a)(4) (1978); VA. CODE § 60.1-52(b) (Cum. Supp.
1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 50.20.090 (1962); W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. § 27-3-106(d) (1977).
The remaining jurisdictions did not adopt the draft bill or subsequently
amended their original enactments. See ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 214(A) (Cum.
6
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Determining benefit eligibility based on a claimant's "direct interest"
in a labor dispute as an individual or member of a grade or class has long
posed problems of interpretation. The broad statutory language, as ap-
plied to the often intricate factual detail of strike situations, at best has
served as a cumbersome implement in paring away unwarranted claims
for compensation without harming the basic policies of the Employment
Security Law.22 Although justified2 s as a preventive measure against strike
tactics that would evade the labor dispute disqualification, 24 the provision
is flawed structurally as an effective tool in disqualifying undeserving
claimants because of an inherent inability to distinguish between workers
unemployed by choice and those involuntarily separated from work.
25
Supp. 1973) (disqualifies claimants whose unemployment is due directly to labor
dispute still in progress at place of employment with no requalifying provisions);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-777(A) (Supp. Pamphlet 1980-1981) (requalifying
provisions disjunctively connected); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1262, 1262.5
(West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1981) (former provides benefit disqualification if
claimant left work due to strike; latter provides for determination of persons in-
eligible by reason of their grade); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315(4) (1979)
(similar to Alabama statute); KY. REV. STAT. § 341.360(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980)
(provides disqualification for unemployment caused by "strike or other bona fide
labor dispute"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1601(4) (West 1964) (disqualifies if
unemployment due to labor dispute in active progress, requalification if claimant
proves not participating or interested in dispute); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
421.49 (1978) (provides detailed definitions of "grade or class" language); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 268.09.1(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1981) (disqualification turns on
voluntary nature of termination); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513(5) (Cum. Supp.
1980) (claimants eligible if unemployment due to lockout not occasioned by in-
dividual acting alone or in concert with others); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593 (McKin-
ney 1977) (similar to Minnesota provision); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(5) (1975)
(disqualifies if work stoppage due to dispute at another plant owned by same
employer which provides necessary supplies to claimant's plant); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D) (Page Supp. 1980) (disqualifies for disputes other than
lockouts); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-16 (1979) (allows requalification if claimant
does not belong to group responsible for strike and is not directly interested in
dispute); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1324.D (1977) ("participating" disqualifies, no
reference to direct interest); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(d) (1953) (disqualifies
members of grade or class, or individual found to be party to agreement to fo-
ment strike, and any person unemployed because of strike involving his grade or
class of worker); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(10) (West 1974) (similar to Ken-
tucky).
22. RSMo § 288.020 (1978).
23. Evaluation of the direct interest disqualification in terms of policy or
principle is not within the scope or purpose of this Casenote. Mr. Shadur suggests
that disqualification is justified only when the claimant's interest is both direct
and beneficial. Shadur, supra note 12, at 329.
24. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
25. See cases cited note 27 infra.
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American decisions are replete with instances in which this insufficiency
has led the courts to inequitable conclusions26 that are inconsistent with
the basic purpose of unemployment insurance, providing security to those
unemployed through no fault of their own.
27
Prior Missouri decisions dealing with the direct interest provision have
not proven particularly helpful in resolving the difficulties of interpreta-
tion evident in the decisions of other states. 28 The most extensive treatment
of the problem was made by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Pogge-
moeller v. Industrial Commission.29 In that case, claimants were
unemployed due to a valid lockout instituted by the employer when a
dispute arose during negotiations of a new contract concerning the terms
and conditions of claimants' employment? After the court surveyed the
decisions of several jurisdictions, it quoted with approval the test as it is
commonly stated:" 'The prevailing rule is that an employee is 'directly in-
terested' in a dispute, when his wages, hours or conditions of work will be
affected favorably or adversely by the outcome of a strike.' "s The court
26. Courts have held employees to be directly interested in a labor dispute
even though they did not approve of the demands made by their bargaining agent
and in fact voted against the strike, Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 571, 13
S.E.2d 863, 867 (1941); whether in fact the area of common interest was attended
by success or failure, Local 658, Boot & Shoe Workers Union v. Brown Shoe Co.,
403 Ill. 484, 490, 87 N.E.2d 625, 630 (1949); Nobes v. Michigan Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n, 313 Mich. 472, 480, 21 N.W.2d 820, 823 (1946); although
unemployment was unquestionably involuntary, Kemiel v. Review Bd., 117 Ind.
App. 357, 358-59, 72 N.E.2d 238, 238-39 (1947); although they were not
members of any union, Nobes v. Michigan Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 313
Mich. at 476, 21 N.W.2d at 821; although it is unknown whether the claimants'
wages will be affected until after settlement of the dispute, Chrysler Corp. v.
Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 452, 298 N.W. 87, 92 (1941); whether the interest is im-
mediate or remote, In re Deep River Timber Co.'s Employees, 8 Wash. 2d 179,
183-84, 111 P.2d 575, 577 (1941).
Classification of claims on a broad basis is sometimes justified as facilitating
administration of employment security laws. See, e.g., Queener v. Magnet Mills,
179 Tenn. 416, 424-25, 167 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1942). This advantage would appear far
outweighed by the inequitable results of such applications.
27. See Sain v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 564 S.W.2d 59 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1978); Beal v. Industrial Comm'n, 535 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. App., K.C.
1975); Crawford v. Industrial Comm'n, 482 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. App., St. L. 1972);
Bussman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 335 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. App., St. L.
1960).
28. See cases cited note 26 supra.
29. 371 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. App., St. L. 1963).
30. Id. at 490.
31. Id. at 505 (quoting Burak v. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 134 Colo.
255, 259, 302 P.2d 182, 184 (1956)). See Huiet v. Boyd, 64 Ga. App. 564, 567, 13
S.E.2d 863, 865 (1941); Martineau v. Director of the Div. of Employment Secur-
ity, 329 Mass. 44, 49, 106 N.E.2d 420, 424 (1952); Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297
1981]
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concluded that "[a] claimant is directly interested in the labor dispute
when he stands to gain or lose by the outcome of the dispute. "32
Although the Pulitzer majority factually distinguished
Poggemoeller,33 it is clear that the latter does not extend to the more nar-
row issue presented before the Pulitzer court: whether under these par-
ticular circumstances claimants actually stood to "gain or lose by the out-
come of the dispute." The Pulitzer court may well have conceded the
earlier case without disturbing the reasoning of its opinion since Pulitzer is
an interpretative refinerfient rather than a divergence from principle. If
the Pulitzer court had found that the alleged vacation offer was sufficiently
firm to be said to directly affect the claimants, the Poggemoeller rule ap-
parently would have required disqualification. Having determined,
however, that the facts indicative of the speculative nature of the vacation
issue could support a finding that claimants would not be affected directly
by the outcome of the strike, the court was not required to rule on the
validity of Poggemoeller. Although it is perhaps unfortunate that Pogge-
moeller was not recognized simply as authority for a principle of greater
latitude than was necessary for the court's decision, the acknowledgment
of its validity clearly is implicit.
A second practical reason compelled the court to approve the findings
of the Commission on the issue of direct interest. A definition of "direct in-
terest" that includes interests created by an "unsolicited conditional prom-
ise by the employer" would open the door for potential abuse and subver-
sion of the Act by allowing the employer to exert pressure on strikers by
making the strike economically harmful to nonunion employees.3 Terms
of employment contained in a conditional agreement are contingent on
the bargaining power, ability, and volition of another representative unit
as well as the employer's own willingness to negotiate the term. Therefore,
these terms should not be categorized as constituting a direct interest in the
outcome of the dispute. Although such an interest may be ascertainable,
Pulitzer insulates the unemployed, nonstriking worker from benefit dis-
qualification by requiring that the interest also be direct and by refusing to
recognize interests that are remote or speculative. Thus, offers that cannot
be expected to affect directly the terms of the claimant's employment
should not disqualify otherwise deserving35 employees from receiving the
benefits of unemployment insurance.
Mich. 438, 451-52, 298 N.W. 87, 92 (1941); A. Borchman Sons v. Carpenter, 166
Neb. 322, 328, 89 N.W.2d 123, 127 (1958); Henzel v. Cameron, 228 Or. 452,
465, 365 P.2d 498, 504 (1961); Wicklund v. Commissioner of Unemployment
Comp., 18 Wash. 2d 206, 216, 138 P.2d 876, 881 (1943).
32. 371 S.W.2d at 505.
33. 596 S.W.2d at 418.
34. Id. at 419.
35. See cases cited note 27 and accompanying text supra.
702 [Vol. 46
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In addition to the no-direct interest provision is a second condition of
eligibility imposed by the statute that extends the direct interest dis-
qualification. The statute requires that the claimant not belong to a grade
or class of workers that has any member with a direct interest.36 This provi-
sion works in tandem with the direct interest disqualification to prevent ac-
tions of the unions intended to evade the statute by implementing "key-
man" strike tactics which place all workers out of employment while
directly involving only a small number of pivotal employees? 7 Since,
however, the same premise underlies the direct interest disqualification, 38
the effect of only key personnel striking should be mitigated or largely
dispelled39 by the direct interest provision, which disqualifies all employees
affected by the dispute regardless of their grade or class, whether union or
nonunion. Thus, in practice, disqualification because of membership in a
grade or class should occur only in those limited instances where the
employee whose interest alone is insufficient to render him ineligible for
benefits is associated with other disqualified employees to such an extent
that to allow benefits would violate the purposes of the Act. 40
Authorities have argued that the grade or class provision is an unjusti-
fiable, arbitrary4' principle of vicarious guilt, 42 the operation of which
results in disqualification of workers often involuntarily unemployed by
acts of their fellow employees. Certainly, any distinction between volun-
tary and involuntary unemployment must derive from a source other than
the statute itself because this provision, like its counterpart, structurally is
not capable of excepting those who have no personal involvement in the
dispute. Despite the unsatisfactory results which flow from disqualifica-
tion by vicarious involvement, the needed changes cannot be accomp-
lished by the judiciary alone.
While subject to broad interpretation, application of the grade or class
provision is intrinsically a factual determination43 that should involve con-
36. See note 7 supra.
37. F.R. Orr Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 188 Colo. 173, 183, 534
P.2d 785, 791 (1975). The argument continues that employees receiving compen-
sation benefits thereby reduce the drain on the union strike fund, violating the
doctrine of state neutrality in labor disputes. Id. See also Chrysler Corp. v. Smith,
297 Mich. 438, 450, 298 N.W. 87, 91 (1941); Spielmann v. Industrial Comm'n,
236 Wis. 240, 248-49, 295 N.W. 1, 5-6 (1940). For an excellent discussion of the
doctrine of neutrality in both England and the United States, see Haggart,
Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB. L. REV. 668, 688
(1958).
38. See Shadur, supra note 12, at 333.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Note, supra note 12, at 553.
41. See Note, supra note 12, at 565.
42. See Shadur, supra note 12, at 332.
43. 596 S.W.2d at 420 n.4. The court cited F.R. Orr Constr. Co. v. Indus-
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sideration of all relevant factors present in the dispute. Although the pro-
vision has been the law in Missouri since 1937, 4 4 the Pulitzer court wrote on
a slate relatively clean of judicial efforts of interpretation . 4  Before
Pulitzer, the primary authority construing the grade or class provision was
dictum in O'Dell v. Division of Employment Security.4" In O'Dell, the
court determined that the proper class included all those employees "doing
essentially the same type of work," finding that employees on either side of
merging automobile production lines were of the same class of workers
within the meaning of the statute. 47 The claimants in O'Dell were
members of the same local union, which was theii exclusive bargaining
agent.48 If O'Dell had been accepted by the Pulitzer majority, it clearly
would have required a finding that the Pulitzer claimants were of the same
class of workers as the Teamsters. 49 To this extent, O'Dell has been disap-
proved. If the decision was found wanting, however, it was not rejected,
because the majority opinion merely distinguished O'Dell factually
trial Comm'n, 188 Colo. 173, 534 P.2d 785 (1975), which is factually similar to
Pulitzer. In Orr, striking carpenters prevented members of various craft unions
from continuing construction work. The employer was a member of an associated
bargaining unit that implemented a lockout at all construction sites whether
picketed or not. Claimants' unions had previously negotiated and signed separate
contracts and were determined to be of a different grade or class than the strikers
in the absence of a community of interest, notwithstanding a high degree of in-
tegration in the work. Id. at 183, 534 P.2d at 791.Judicial review of the Commis-
sion's findings as to grade or class are limited as are those made as to direct in-
terest.
44. 1937 Mo. Laws 591, § 10 (current version at RSMo § 288.040 (1978)).
45. See cases cited note 13 and accompanying text supra.
46. 376 S.W.2d 137 (Mo. 1964). The central issue in O'Dell was whether
claimants' unemployment was due to a stoppage of work that existed because of
a labor dispute within RSMO § 288.040.4 (1959) (current version at RSMO §
288.040.5 (1978)). Determining that the claimants failed to show that the dis-
qualification was inapplicable, the court further indicated that claimants did not
sustain their burden of proof concerning the requalification provisions. Hence,
O'Dell may be read to hold against the claimants therein because of their failure
to prove the first eligibility requirement, individual noninvolvement. The
remarks concerning the second requirement, therefore, would be dicta.
47. 376 S.W.2d at 146.
48. Id.
49. O'Dell's grade or class language was based on the authority of
Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Martin, 228 N.C. 277, 45 S.E.2d 385 (1947)
and Dravo Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 246, 144
A.2d 670 (-1958). Martin determined that finishers and boarders at a hosiery mill
were of the same grade or class because of the interdependence of operations. 228
N.C. at 279, 45 S.E.2d at 386. Dravo held that truck drivers, operating engineers,
and general laborers were all "construction workers" and, therefore, of the same
class. 187 Pa. Super. Ct. at 251, 144 A.2d at 672.
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without passing on its validity as precedent. 50 Although it remains to be
decided whether Missouri law now contains two inconsistent standards for
grade or class determinations, the factual nature of the inquiry makes in-
evitable the conclusion that administrative and judicial officers will con-
tinue to have wide latitude in which to make their findings and will remain
subject to limited review.5" In fact, Pulitzer's actual contribution in clari-
fying the application of the grade or class disqualification may be limited
to the broad proposition that findings of fact by the Commission will be
sustained if supported by the evidence in the record presented to the
reviewing court.52
The dissent in Pulitzer complained that the majority's approach ex-
cluded "relevant similarities" between the claimants and the striking
Teamsters,5 3 arguing that those employees who would gain a contractual
right to additional vacation benefits should be disqualified as a class
despite the fact that they had little else in common with the strikers.
54
50. The Pulitzer court avoided a possible conflict by declaring the issues in
O'Dell to be "markedly different" than those before them and not controlling
their determination that the type of work done by claimants was not of such
nature as to bring them within a class with the Teamsters. 596 S.W.2d at 420.
While the majority factually distinguished O'Dell, it remains difficult to reconcile
the conflict of authority relied on in that opinion with the decision in Pulitzer.
51. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
52. 596 S.W.2d at 421.
53. Id. at 425 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Welliver, J., dissenting). Judge Welliver first noted that a justiciable
controversy existed only between the Commission and the employer since the
claimants would retain benefits paid to them regardless of the outcome of the
controversy. RSMO § 288.070.6 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The employer, however,
would be charged with the payments made to claimants in the event the court
found claimants eligible and affirmed the circuit court. Id. § 288.070.7. Judge
Welliver argued that the majority erred in concluding that the nonstriking
employees did not constitute a "grade or class" in the sense contemplated by the
statute by virtue of their common interest in the fifth week of vacation. Assuming,
as did the dissent, that claimants held a direct interest in the dispute, it would ap-
pear difficult to defend this conclusion because subsections (a) and (b) are written
conjunctively, indicating that the two exceptions are separate and distinct issues
to be proven by the claimant. Moreover, because subsection (b) contains both
"grade or class" and "direct interest" lanaguge, it is a strained construction to
assert that a shared interest, whether direct or not, per se forms a class. This
reading of the statute has been rejected uniformly by other courts construing
identical provisions. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.,
165 Pa. Super. Ct. 385, 68 A.2d 393 (1949), the court stated:
No person unemployed because of a labor dispute can recover
unemployment compensation unless he can prove that he is not directly
interested, and he is not a member of the striking union, and he is not of
the same grade or class of workers as the strikers. There is no justification
for the position that the three conjunctive tests are merely one test
12
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Although the majority did not respond to that proposition, a careful
reading of the Missouri statute and substantial authority from other
jurisdictions indicate that the "direct interest" and "grade or class" provi-
sions are to be established by the claimant as separate and distinct
elements s5
Despite the shortcomings of the labor dispute disqualification statute,
Pulitzer accomplishes a significant advancement in application of the pro-
vision's ambiguous language to achieve equitable results. A more concise
approach, focusing on the causal relationship between the claimant's in-
terest and the outcome of the dispute, reduces the tendency to apply in-
flexible standards to the determination of benefit disqualification.5 6 The
court has turned properly5l the focus of inquiry to the nature of the in-
phrased in three different ways.
Id. at 392, 68 A.2d at 396.
In Brown Shoe Co. v. Gordon, 405 Ill. 384, 91 N.E.2d 381 (1950), the court
summarily disposed of the employer's contention that the claimants' interest in
the labor dispute constituted a class in itself: "Obviously, this meaning includes
something more than the group directly interested in the dispute, for otherwise
the second condition would be superfluous." Id. at 394, 91 N.E.2d at 386.
Prefacing the court of appeals' discussion of the Pulitzer grade or class issue
was its recognition that such a determination was not essential due to its opinion
that claimants held a direct interest in the Teamsters dispute. [1979] 6 UNEMPL.
INS. REP (CCH) 8363, at 28,785. Regardless of the merits of the argument for a
construction that would encompass, as a grade or class, workers who hold an in-
terest in the dispute, such an approach cannot impact on eligibility because the
situation to which it is applicable cannot arise. Manifestly, if a claimant is found
to have a direct interest in the dispute, he has failed to satisfy one of the two man-
datory conditions of eligibility and will be disqualified whether he is found to be
within a given "grade or class" or not. Conversely, if no direct interest is
discovered, it quite obviously could not be used as a basis for finding membership
in a grade or class. Moreover, disqualifying provisions are to be narrowly con-
strued to most nearly effect the purposes of the Act. O'Dell v. Division of Employ-
ment Security, 376 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Mo. 1964); Kroger Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 314 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Mo. App., St. L. 1958).
The limited theoretical area in which such an application could operate to
disqualify would be that in which the claimant has no individual interest in the
dispute, but other persons concededly of the same class will be affected. Practical-
ly, an absence of individual direct interest will indicate a fortiori nonmembership
in an affected class.
55. See note 54 supra.
56. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
57. The result appears to be sustained by the general weight of authority,
although the definition is novel to most courts. Nestle Co. v. Johnson, 68 Ill. App.
3d 17, 385 N.E.2d 793 (1979) was strikingly similar to Pulitzer. In Nestle, two
unions negotiated separate contracts with the employer, although the terms were
usually identical and the employees expected as much. When one union called a
13
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terest, discarding mechanical distinctions employed in other
jurisdictions. 8 An actual definition of the term "directly" ascribes
substance to the substantive portion of the phrase. In providing a
definitive interpretation, the court has taken an approach advocated by
critics59 of this portion of employment compensation law, for the term is
useful only when it is recognized that some claimants may be only indirect-
ly interested in the subject matter of the dispute. The undesirable effects of
the provision's inherent structural flaws60 are mitigated by an analysis
that inquires into the substantive validity of the asserted claim rather
than relying on the time-worn precedents of other jurisdictions. Although
the faults of labor dispute disqualifications ultimately may be repaired on-
ly by legislative action, Pulitzer is a noteworthy example of the judicial at-
tempt to mitigate the statute's harsh results in the interim.
ROBERT DAVID RAY
strike during negotiations, the others became unemployed and were held not
directly interested. The court stated that
[t]he mere expectancy of better economic terms in their own new con-
tract upon conclusion of the machinists' strike did not give the operating
engineers a direct interest in the machinists' labor dispute .... At the
most, this record reveals an indirect interest in the outcome of the
machinists' strike; that is not sufficient for the denial of benefits.
Id. at 20, 385 N.E.2d at 796.
58. See, e.g., Local 658, Boot & Shoe Workers Union v. Brown Shoe Co.,
403 Ill. 484, 491, 87 N.E.2d 625, 630 (1949), wherein the court stated that when a
work stoppage occurs because of a labor dispute, "every employee thereby put out
of employment is directly interested." Predictably, this decision has been the sub-
ject of criticism. See Shadur, supra note 12, at 331.
59. See Reuben & Schuckers, The Labor Dispute Disqualification of the
Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 211, 243
(1977); Shadur, supra note 12, at 330.
60. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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